Belarus’ energy sector: strategy or stagnation?
Despite a full recovery in electricity demand and the completion of the Astravets nuclear power plant (NPP), Belarus’ energy sector remains tightly interwoven with Russian imports. The launch of the second unit of the NPP in 2023 has led to a notable shift in the electricity mix, reducing the role of thermal power plants (TPPs), but also reinforcing dependence on nuclear fuel from Russia.
Electricity consumption re-bounded in 2023-24, this was driven by state-led electrification efforts and deeper trade ties with Russia. The energy system continues to be characterised by state ownership, subsidised tariffs, and limited progress on renewables and energy efficiency.
Energy sector governance and ownership
Belarus’ energy sector remains strictly centralised, with vertically integrated, state-owned companies dominating most levels of the value chain – from generation to distribution. The Ministry of Energy oversees these entities, while the tariff system continues to be shaped by government control. Enterprises subsidise residential consumers, and tariffs remain well below cost-recovery levels. Although the Department of Energy Efficiency exists formally outside the Ministry, it remains politically subordinated to overall state energy objectives, with limited policy autonomy. Russia’s Gazprom maintains control over gas transmission, reinforcing the external grip on Belarus’ energy security.
Primary and final energy consumption
Belarus continues to import almost all of its primary energy – including 99% of natural gas and 90% of crude oil – from Russia. Domestic energy production remains minimal at only 6.3 Mtoe, while energy imports (31 Mtoe) even exceed total primary energy supply due to Belarus’ large oil refining industry that processes additional crude oil for re-export.
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Final energy consumption continues to be dominated by residential heating, with heat and natural gas as primary energy carriers. In 2024, electricity consumption increased by 6% yoy, after a brief decline in 2022 linked to sanctions, economic slowdown, and population outflow. The rebound was driven by government-led electrification of households and transport – including installation of electric boilers and tariff incentives. Still, Belarus’ final energy consumption remains fossil-heavy: oil products (29%), heat (27%) and gas (22%) dominate the mix. Fossil energy continues to anchor both domestic consumption and energy service provision.
Gas and oil supply chains
Belarus imports 99% of its natural-gas needs from Russia at a current price of USD 128.5/tcm and is pushing for a unified gas market that would lower the price to about USD 70/tcm. About 40% of gas is burnt for residential heat, 20% for industry and around 30% is used as feedstock in petrochemicals. Oil reliance is equally stark. Two state-owned refineries – Mazyr and Naftan (design capacity 19 Mt/yr) – processed only ~14 Mt in 2023 after EU sanctions. Crude continues to flow almost exclusively via Russia’s Druzhba pipeline and over 90 % of oil-product exports have been rerouted through Russian Baltic ports. The discount on Russian crude oil deliveries yielded an estimated USD 1.9 bn budget inflow in 2023, but further entrenched dependence on Russian supply, logistics and pricing.
The shifting electricity mix
Electricity generation grew by nearly 5% yoy in 2024, reaching 43.1 TWh. Nuclear generation now accounts for 36%, up from 0% in 2019, following the commissioning of the second Astravets unit.
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While this has significantly reduced the share of gas-fired thermal generation (now 54%), both sources remain fully dependent on fuel imports from Russia.
Grid connection challenges
Belarus remains synchronised with the Integrated/Unified Power System (IPS/UPS) operated from Russia. Ukraine (2022) and the Baltic states (2025) have now left IPS/UPS for ENTSO-E, sharply reducing regional trading partners.
To maintain grid stability and ensure secure operation of the Astravets nuclear power plant, Belarus commissioned a new 330 kV Lukoml GRES – Novosokolniki line to Russia in March 2025. The project was part of Belarus’ response to the evolving regional grid configuration and aimed to prevent potential outages related to the loss of synchronisation with neighbouring systems.
While this technical reinforcement ensures system stability in the near term, the implications for cross-border electricity trade remain limited. Belarus and Russia recently signed a common electricity market agreement, but actual trade volumes are expected to remain low due to limited demand and relatively low electricity prices in Russia (3.8 – 5.6 EUR cents/kWh). As a result, the agreement is currently more relevant from a regulatory and political perspective than in terms of commercial exchange.
Integration of the NPP has driven large-scale grid spending: EUR 1.8 bn for network upgrades plus EUR 105 m to mitigate Baltic de-synchronisation. Planned decommissioning of ~1 GW of gas plants is matched by the rollout of 916 MW of electric boilers for district heating.
Renewable energy – potential remains untapped
Despite substantial solar and biomass potential, Belarus has no concrete roadmap to expand renewable energy sources. Wind potential of up to 1,600 MW and solar potential of 578 TWh/year remain untapped. Renewables development is mostly confined to the heating sector, with no utility-scale projects currently planned. The 2035 energy strategy targets a modest 9% share of domestic/renewable sources in primary supply, up from about 5% today.
Stalled energy efficiency progress
After early gains in the 1990s and early 2000s, energy intensity improvements in Belarus have stagnated. The economy remains more energy intensive than the global average and peer Eastern European countries. Low prices and lack of incentives limit progress, especially in the residential sector. Final consumption accounts for only 70% of total supply, with 30% lost in transformation and transmission. On emissions, Belarus’ NDC allows for a rise in net GHG emissions by 2030 relative to current levels. While energy sector emissions have declined by 44% since 1990, most of the reductions occurred before 2000 – and absolute emissions have remained stable since then.
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Outlook: Strategy or stagnation?
Electricity demand is expected to continue growing, primarily due to further electrification. Yet this growth occurs within a rigid system shaped by geopolitical developments, centralised planning, and near-total reliance on Russian imports. The commissioning of additional nuclear units is under discussion, but financial and technological dependencies pose long-term strategic risks. Renewables are likely to remain marginal without stronger policy support. With the loss of Western and Baltic interconnections, Russia is now Belarus’s sole viable electricity partner, reinforcing both commercial and geopolitical dependence. Belarus’ energy policy, though stable at first glance, remains fundamentally backward-looking – prioritising control and continuity over sustainability and diversification.
This newsletter is based on the “Energy sector monitor”
